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Abstract
In this note, we consider a simple duopoly environment in which
two parent rms compete in a market. We assume that there are
cost dierentials between these two parent rms. The parent rms'
choices of divisionalization are modeled as a two-stage game. It will
be shown that the number of divisions of a parent rm with a cost
advantage (i.e., lower marginal costs) is relatively large. The results
imply that the cost advantage of one parent rm will be magnied
through divisionalization decisions.
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1 Introduction
In today's world of global competition, rm behavior is critical in determin-
ing market structure. In particular, many rms recognize their retail and
distribution facilities (i.e., `downstream' divisions) as an important strategic
device to obtain better access to markets.
We argue that in the presence of divisionalization decisions, cost hetero-
geneity among rms aects market outcomes because of the changed com-
petition structure. To illustrate this point, we consider a simple duopoly
environment in which two parent rms compete in a market. We assume
that there are cost dierentials between these two parent rms. The parent
rms' choices of divisionalization are modeled as a two-stage game. It will
be shown that the number of divisions of a parent rm with a cost advantage
(i.e., lower marginal costs) is relatively large. The results imply that the
cost advantage of one parent rm will be magnied through divisionalization
decisions.
This paper is closely related to the recent literature on strategic divi-
sionalization. Corchon (1991), Polasky (1992), Baye et al. (1996a, b), and
Yuan (1999) analyze the strategic incentives for rms to form independent
divisions. Their analyses concentrated on the case of identical cost structure.
Contrary to this, we concentrate on the case of asymmetric cost structure.
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2 The Model
Consider a model with two parent rms, Firm A and Firm B. Parent rms
intend to make divisionalization decisions in a market. The inverse demand
function is p =   Q, where p is the price and Q is the total output of the
product, respectively. A divisionalization game is modeled as a simultaneous-
move, two-stage game among prot-maximizing parent rms. In the rst
stage, each parent rm chooses a number of competing units, which we will
henceforth call `divisions'. In the second stage, all these divisions participate
in the market as independent Cournot-Nash players in a simultaneous-move
homogeneous product oligopoly. Letting ni denote the number of divisions
chosen by Firm i in the rst stage and qi the output of each division of Firm
i. The cost of adding another division, F > 0, is constant and identical for
both parent rms. It is assumed that there are cost dierentials between the
two rms' divisions: we normalize Firm A divisions' marginal cost to zero,
while c (c > 0) represents Firm B divisions' marginal costs.
We can solve for the second-stage Cournot equilibrium outputs as a func-
tion of the number of divisions chosen in the rst-stage. Given the number
of divisions, the equilibrium output of each division and equilibrium price
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become1
qA =
+ nBc
(1 + nA + nB)
; (1)
qB =
  (nA + 1)c
(1 + nA + nB)
; (2)
p =
+ nBc
1 + nA + nB
: (3)
Note that, due to cost dierentials, each Firm A division produces more than
each Firm B division (i.e., qA > qB).
Then, we can write the prot for each parent rm as
A =
nA(+ nBc)
2
(1 + nA + nB)2
  nAF; (4)
B =
nB[  (nA + 1)c]2
(1 + nA + nB)2
  nBF: (5)
In the rst-stage, each parent rm chooses the number of divisions in the
third market, taking as given the divisionaliation decisions of its rival. Dif-
ferentiating (4) and (5) with respect to the number of divisions, and setting
the result equal to zero yields the following reaction functions for each parent
rm.23
AnA =
(1  nA + nB)(+ nBc)2
(1 + nA + nB)3
  F = 0; (6)
1Note that each Firm A division's prot is qA(   Q) while each Firm B division's
prot is qB(  Q  c), where Q =P qA +P qB .
2Subscripts denote partial derivatives throughout.
3It is straightforward to check that the second-order conditions are met.
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BnB =
(1 + nA   nB)[  (nA + 1)c]2
(1 + nA + nB)3
  F = 0: (7)
The comparative statics eects (dnA=dc) and (dnB=dc) can be obtained by
totally dierentiating these conditions with respect to nA, nB, and c as fol-
lows:
AnAnAdn
A +AnAnBdn
B +AnAcdc = 0; (8)
BnBnAdn
A +BnBnBdn
B +BnBcdc = 0: (9)
These equations can be solved as
dnA=dc = (BnBc
A
nAnB   AnAcBnBnB)=D; (10)
dnB=dc = (BnBnA
A
nAc   AnAnABnBc)=D; (11)
where D = AnAnA
B
nBnB   AnAnBBnBnA . Given the assumption that nA and
nB are strategic substitutes (i.e., AnAnB < 0 and 
B
nBnA < 0) as dened by
Bulow et al. (1985), we can obtain that (dnA=dc) > 0 and (dnB=dc) < 0.4
Proposition: In the divisionalization game in the market, the parent rm
with the lowest costs will have the largest number of divisions.
This implies the dominance of the cost-advantaged rm's divisions in
the market: not only each division with a cost-advantage produces a larger
4This assumption holds and a stable equilibrium with D > 0 exists when (i) c is
suciently small and (ii) (F )1=2 + c <  < 3
p
3(F )1=2 is satised.
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output (qA > qB), but also the number of such divisions becomes larger in
the market (nA > nB). The principle involved is that, since the motivation
to divisionalization is to commit a higher output level in the product market,
a cost-competitive parent rm (which has a higher incentive to shift prots)
will choose a larger number of divisions in the rst stage.
3 Conclusion
In a two-stage game with divisionalization, it has been shown that a cost ad-
vantage for a parent rm will result in a relatively larger number of divisions
in the market. In other words, an initial cost-advantage for one rm will be
magnied through divisionalization decisions.
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